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Abstract
This brief commentary seeks to develop the analysis of Daniels, Porteny and Urrutia of the implications of expansion 
of the scope of health technology assessment (HTA) beyond issues of safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. Drawing 
in particular on experience in the United Kingdom, it suggests that such expansion can be understood not only as a 
response to the problem of insufficiency of evidence, but also to that of legitimacy. However, as expansion of HTA 
also renders it more visibly political in character, it is plausible that its legitimacy may be undermined, rather than 
enhanced by, independence from the policy process. 
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In their article ‘Expanded HTA: Enhancing Fairness and Legitimacy’,1 Norman Daniels, Thalia Porteny, and Julian Urrutia consider the implications of the increasing 
tendency to broaden the scope of health technology assessment 
(HTA) to embrace questions of ethics (such as equity), budget 
impact and financial protection, alongside its longer-standing 
concerns with safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness. Such 
expansion enables HTA to furnish decision-makers with 
the additional evidence which is needed for them to make 
judgements on the distribution of scarce healthcare resources, 
given that all such judgements will encompass matters 
beyond the ‘traditional’ HTA remit. Nonetheless, the authors 
note that while such expansion thereby assures the relevance 
of HTA to allocative decision-making, it also brings with it a 
danger of ‘overreach,’ which might imperil the legitimacy of 
the recommendations which emerge from the HTA process. 
However, this risk can be minimised, in the view of the 
authors, if expanded HTA is embedded in a fair, deliberative 
process which meets the conditions of the ‘accountability 
for reasonableness’ model and which, to secure legitimacy, 
should be independent of vested interests.
The analysis offered by Daniels, Porteny, and Urrutia is 
extremely valuable in alerting us to the ongoing need to 
confront problems of legitimacy as institutions and processes 
for decision-making on allocation of healthcare resources 
continue to evolve, as seems certain to happen. Given the 
significant fiscal pressures on contemporary health systems 
across the globe, newer HTA agencies have been conferred 
with a regulatory function which their oldest counterparts 
did not possess: they operate as a key component of political 
strategies to reduce inefficiencies and waste in healthcare. 
However, the boundary between the ‘rationalisation’ of 
ineffective interventions and the ‘rationing’ of those which are 
effective is extremely fuzzy,2 especially from the wider public’s 
perspective. 
The consequence is, that, as HTA expands to meet the charge 
of irrelevancy – that is, that its process of evaluation and the 
recommendations which result have tended previously to 
provide insufficient evidence upon all of the matters which 
decision-makers need to consider when making judgements 
on distribution of scarce healthcare resources – and thus to 
play a regulatory role, so it tends increasingly to generate the 
‘suspicion, distrust and even resistance’ which characterises 
the ‘legitimacy problem’ in healthcare resource allocation.3 
Efforts to address this problem provide in themselves further 
rationales for extension of the scope of HTA. 
Instructive in this regard is the early history of the best-known 
HTA agency in the world, the United Kingdom’s National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Although 
there was an awareness from the date of the establishment 
of the Institute in 1999 that its activities would necessitate 
making judgements on matters beyond those which could be 
inferred from the available scientific evidence base,4 ‘initially 
NICE found it difficult to address issues of equity with any 
degree of sophistication,’5 and thus, its recommendations were 
based primarily on evaluation of data on clinical efficacy and 
cost-effectiveness. This ‘technocratic fix’ proved inadequate 
because, as leading figures in the Institute noted, scientific 
evidence is neither perfect nor all-embracing. ‘Social value 
judgments’ – that is, those concerning ‘what is appropriate 
and acceptable for society in delivering healthcare’6 – were 
also needed, but ‘NICE and its advisory bodies... have no 
particular legitimacy to determine the social values of those 
served by the NHS [National Health Service].’7 To address 
this dimension of the problem of legitimacy, NICE took 
two steps. First, it published a set of guidelines on social 
value judgements, with which all guidance produced by the 
Institute was expected to comply (and with an obligation to 
explain clearly any departure from it).8 Secondly, it established 
a deliberative body, the Citizen’s Council, as a means of 
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ascertaining the views of the United Kingdom public on 
questions relating to social values and feeding into the 
Institute’s work (including the development of the guidance 
on social value judgements). While these developments have 
not passed uncriticised,9,10 they appear to correspond to the 
model of expanded HTA noted by Daniels, Porteny, and 
Urrutia and to their prescription of its embeddedness within 
a deliberative process, consistent with ‘accountability for 
reasonableness.’
On Daniels, Porteny and Urrutia’s analysis, such 
embeddedness should have sufficed, at least in part, to offset 
concerns as to the legitimacy of NICE recommendations 
which might have arisen as it expanded the scope of the 
criteria which are considered within the HTA process. Yet, 
the Institute continues to encounter challenges to its role in 
determining affordability of treatments and services, that is, 
the budget impact of HTA. A particular area of controversy is 
the ‘threshold’ applied to determine whether an intervention 
can be deemed cost-effective, and thus, recommended for 
coverage. Although NICE merely has a somewhat ill-defined 
mandate to consider ‘the broad balance of benefits and 
costs of the provision of health services…in England,’11 its 
application of such a threshold – calculated on the basis of cost 
per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) gained – is effectively 
determinative of access to the treatments and services which 
it appraises. This is so because a legal obligation exists to fund 
interventions which the Institute recommends for use, while 
scarcity of resources renders it highly improbable that any 
non-recommended interventions would be routinely covered 
(although clinicians might intermittently succeed in securing 
access to such treatments or services for individual patients 
based upon proof of exceptional circumstances).12 This key 
decisional tool has engendered considerable controversy. 
Since determination of the threshold is logically equivalent to 
determination of the available NHS budget – a matter which it 
is ‘constitutionally improper’ for NICE to decide – the Institute 
must act as a ‘threshold searcher’ rather than as a ‘threshold 
setter.’13 But it is unclear that the threshold which applies is 
set at the correct level: that is, NICE recommendations may 
displace more QALYs than are gained,14 and thus, ‘the approval 
of new drugs is doing more harm than good to NHS patients 
overall.’15 Furthermore, dissatisfaction with the threshold 
has prompted activity in the political arena to dispense with 
it in certain circumstances: initially through pressure upon 
NICE to establish an exception for life-extending, end-of-life 
treatments; and latterly in the form of an election manifesto 
promise to create a specified fund for financing provision of 
cancer treatments, in essence circumventing the NICE HTA 
process altogether for such interventions. 
It might be argued that any problems of legitimacy occur in 
this context precisely because of an absence of ‘embeddedness.’ 
That is, while certain aspects of NICE’s expanded form of HTA 
might be seen as deriving legitimacy from a fair, deliberative 
process (albeit that, as noted above, even these are not immune 
to criticism), its engagement with questions of budget impact 
is not so regarded because no such process of deliberation on 
this matter has occurred. It is notable that, while the Citizen’s 
Council has discussed the issue of whether departure from 
the threshold is ever permissible,16 the a priori questions of 
whether a cost-effectiveness threshold should exist at all, and 
if so, at what level it should be fixed, have not been put to it.
But it is also plausible that the difficulties encountered by 
NICE in this context are indicative that HTA, especially in its 
expanded form, is – as NICE has acknowledged – inextricably 
intertwined with priority-setting in healthcare, which is 
‘inescapably a political process.’17 To put matters somewhat 
differently, and adopting the metaphorical terminology 
which is deployed in the literature, HTA can be regarded less 
as a ‘bridge’ between scientific research and policy-making,18 
with the implication that it connects the two but is somehow 
distinct from each; but rather as an activity which ‘belongs to 
both communities’19 – thus, the issues addressed within HTA 
cannot be disentangled from the concerns and interests which 
arise in the political arena. For example, NICE’s concession 
to pressure to adjust the threshold in respect of end-of-life 
treatments can itself be seen as a political act. 
It seems to this author that reading expanded HTA as a 
deeply politically-charged process, albeit one with scientific 
underpinnings, presents us with a somewhat different set 
of conclusions from those drawn by Daniels, Porteny, and 
Urrutia, especially in relation to the value of independence. 
Certainly, adherence to this characteristic assists in protecting 
against that ‘skepticism about the legitimacy of coverage 
decisions…[which] derives from the belief that HTA is in the 
service of vested interests that control the health system.’1 But 
it generates a further problem: here, “overreaching” becomes 
a question of democratic (il)legitimacy, of (in)competence to 
determine matters – or at least, to apply decisional criteria – 
which, constitutionally, should properly be decided by elected 
representatives. As seen in the case of the NICE threshold, 
it is the objectification, technification and depoliticisation of 
an inherently political question as the basis for an allocative 
decision which generates misgivings, criticism and opposition 
in relation to HTA. 
This is not a problem peculiar to the health policy and 
management arena. The rise of HTA, and its continuing 
expansion in scope, can be seen as an illustration of a broader 
trend in modern governance: the rise of the ‘regulatory state.’ 
Theorists have identified that a central puzzle of this form of 
political arrangement surrounds the legitimacy of decisions 
taken by the various independent regulatory agencies which 
undertake many of the tasks previously assigned to elected and 
accountable politicians.20 However, there is no easy resolution 
of this problem. Effective mechanisms of accountability are 
likely to prove of crucial importance, as Daniels, Porteny, and 
Urrutia recognise. But designing these is awkward because 
of an inherent tension with the independence which is the 
central characteristic of this form of governance. To take 
an example: giving politicians the ‘last word’ on decisions 
emerging from the HTA process provides some degree of 
accountability to elected representatives, and hence to the 
public. Yet it substantially undermines one of the primary 
political rationales for the evolution of the ‘technocratic fix’ of 
HTA in the first place: its capacity to ‘defang political conflict’ 
on matters of resource allocation in healthcare.21 Even if a 
presumption exists that the recommendations of the HTA 
agency will be followed (as called for by Daniels, Porteny, 
and Urrutia), the requirement to ‘sign off ’ the decisions at 
ministerial level creates a space for articulation of precisely 
the type of dissension and disagreement which politicians 
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sought to minimise through creation of independent bodies 
such as NICE.
There is little doubt that the expansion of HTA – both in 
terms of its scope, but also its geographical reach across 
health systems – will continue well into the foreseeable future. 
Daniels, Porteny, and Urrutia have provided a valuable service 
in alerting us to some of the implications of this development. 
It has been my intention in this brief comment to offer 
additional reflections which should serve to demonstrate 
that further critical analysis of expanded HTA is certainly 
warranted. Given both the significance of this key regulatory 
activity of the modern state and the controversy which it 
inevitably attracts, it is to be hoped that neither analysts nor 
makers of health policy will shrink from undertaking such a 
task. 
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